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RULES, THE RULE OF LAW, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 
Frederick Schauer* 
Traditionally, people have equated the rule of law with the rule 
of rules. What is good about the rule of law, so it is said, is its 
generality and consequent impersonality. The virtues of the rule of 
law reside in the way in which law avoids situational particularity, 
and thus in the way law tries to be comparatively acontextual. We 
prefer the rule of law to the rule of men [sic] because we are con-
cerned to minimize unconstrained discretion. The rule of law is 
seen to express a preference for what you are over who you are, for 
what type of thing you did rather than what precisely you did here. 
The virtues of the rule of law, therefore, traditionally characterized 
in terms of a preference for generality and a preference for decision 
according to types and not particulars, are seen to resemble those 
virtues commonly associated with decision according to rules. 
Only recently have people begun, quite justifiably, to question 
the conftation of the rule of law with decision according to rule. 1 
Recognizing the distinction between the rule of law and the rule of 
rules is long overdue, for rules are simply not universal goods. 
They reduce sensitivity to the circumstances of individual events; 
they preclude, at least partially, full attention to the context in 
which legal decisions are made; and they block empathy with par-
ticular claimants and particular victims.2 In attempting to disable 
wicked, misguided, or simply incompetent decisionmakers from do-
ing wrong, rules also disable wise, well-intentioned, and capable 
decisionmakers from reaching the optimal results in individual 
instances.J 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
I. See, e.g .. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); 
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986); Michelman, 
Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World, in JusTIFICATION 71 (J. 
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986); Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 10 (1987). 
2. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 
1685 (1976). 
3. See Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good? (Book Review), 86 
YALE L.J. 561 (1977); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). 
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Because rules thus entail a panoply of detriments accompany-
ing their alleged benefits, it is hardly obvious that decisionmaking 
according to rule need be the only decisional mode employed by the 
state. Moreover, it is not much more obvious that decisionmaking 
according to rule should be the only decisional mode employed even 
by those decisionmaking institutions commonly called "the legal 
system." Indeed, equating legal decisionmaking of legal institutions 
with decisionmaking according to rule may be as descriptively inac-
curate as it is normatively dubious. Equity, for example, was origi-
nally conceived as precisely a method for avoiding the inevitable 
over- and under-inclusiveness of rule-bound decisionmaking,4 how-
ever much our current rule-soaked practice of equity has departed 
from that original understanding. But even now, numerous other 
decisionmaking modes within the formal legal system are designed 
to maximize sensitivity to all of the facts of a particular case, rather 
than restrict a decisionmaker to some narrower class of more re-
peatable and easily identified facts. Thus, the advantages of rules 
frequently give way to other virtues, as in the focus on "the best 
interests of the child" in custody determinations, the range of con-
siderations taken into account in sentencing (and especially capital 
sentencing) determinations, and the substantially contextual deci-
sionmaking processes of numerous administrative agencies.s 
"The rule of law," however, is a phrase whose positive emotive 
content cannot easily be jettisoned. Insofar as legal systems are per-
ceived to have achieved some measure of success, "the rule of law" 
becomes synonymous with "the good things about the legal sys-
tem." As we increasingly recognize that many desirable features of 
some legal systems avoid rule-based decisionmaking, we thus en-
counter a terminological problem. The traditional terminology 
treats "the rule of law" as entailing decision according to rule, and 
also as making a positive statement about that form of decisionmak-
ing. But when we recognize that some of the good things about the 
legal system do not involve acontextual rule-based decisionmaking, 
there is, quite properly, an effort to ensure that we also attach the 
positive emotive associations of the phrase "the rule of law" to some 
number of comparatively rule-free decisional modes. Thus, "the 
rule of law" might legitimately be used to refer not only to rule-
based decisionmaking, but also to non-rule-based decisionmaking 
incorporating other arguably desirable features. Among these 
would be public written explanation and justification of results, de-
4. Indeed, this is the conception of equity we inherit from Aristotle. ARISTOTLE, 
ETHICS 127 (0. Chase trans. 1937). 
5. See Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59 (1987). 
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cisions made only after hearing both sides, decisions made by deci-
sionmakers not directly related to the parties and their interests, 
and decisions made by decisionmakers comparatively removed from 
the ephemeral ebbs and flows of the partisan political process. This 
list is far from complete, and other virtues could be added, all of 
which would be compatible with a particularistic and contextual 
avoidance of the constraints of rules. 
If we include within the phrase "the rule of law," and therefore 
include within the very idea of law, this wide a range of techniques 
and institutions, the question whether constitutional law is "really 
law" becomes trivially true, and so does the related question 
whether constitutional decisionmaking ought to be legal in its prac-
tice. Under this approach, we discover, not surprisingly, that con-
stitutional adjudication becomes, by definition, an exemplification 
of decision according to law. This attempt to encompass within 
"the rule of law" diverse decisional modes ought to be welcomed 
and not condemned. It appropriately reminds us that other forms 
of decisionmaking might be properly situated within the govern-
ment in general and the formal legal system in particular. More-
over, expanding the ambit of "the rule of law" usefully reminds us 
that adjudication, even constitutional adjudication, differs from 
day-to-day partisan politics in important and sometimes advanta-
geous ways even when it does not operate substantially in rule-con-
strained mode. 
Once we have cleared away the definitional underbrush created 
by the quite understandable desire not to cede the emotive associa-
tions of the "rule of law" entirely to rule-based decisionmaking, we 
can still ask what is desirable at all about rule-based decisionmak-
ing, and where in the legal system it should be employed. My goal 
here is to do this with constitutional adjudication. I want first to 
clarify briefly the very idea of rule-based decisionmaking, and then 
to think about whether that method ought to be employed for con-
stitutional decisionmaking. Even a negative answer to that question 
ought not, as I have said, to delegitimate the "legal" status of con-
stitutional law, but it might show the nature of the constitutional 
enterprise in a different light. 
I 
Our question has thus been transformed, narrowed, and clari-
fied: To what extent does, and to what extent should, constitutional 
law exist as an enterprise substantially involving rule-bound deci-
sionmaking? But in order to focus on this question, I must address 
first the general idea of rule-bound decisionmaking. What is it to 
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make decisions according to rules? And just what is a rule, 
anyway? 
In answering this question, I do not want to rely on what 
might or might not be labelled a "rule" in ordinary language. In-
stead I want to distinguish two different forms of decision. I believe 
one has a more comfortable affinity with the ordinary language use 
of the word "rule" than does the other, but nothing turns on this 
linguistic intuition. I could as easily label the two forms of decision 
"Mutt" and "Jeff," and then ask whether constitutional decision-
making should be in the Mutt mode or in the Jeff mode. 
Although it is conventional to distinguish prescriptive from de-
scriptive rules, there is an intriguing similarity between the two. In-
itially, of course, the distinction and not the similarity jumps out at 
us. "As a rule it is windy in March" is different from the Rule in 
Shelley's Case, just as the law of France differs from the law of grav-
ity, and Newton's First Principle differs from the Principles of Eq-
uity. Rules that merely describe an empirical regularity are 
commonly and properly taken to be importantly different from 
rules that attempt not to describe the world but to exert pressure on 
it. 
Despite this difference, however, descriptive and prescriptive 
rules share the property of generality. Just as one cannot descrip-
tively generalize about only one instance, so too would it be incor-
rect to describe as a prescriptive rule a particular command, or a 
particular order. Rules, prescriptive as well as descriptive, speak to 
types and not to particulars. 
It may tum out, however, that in the circumstances of applica-
tion some item or event that is in fact within the generalization, that 
is an instance of the articulated type, is now seen to be inappropri-
ate for the treatment previously prescribed for all members of the 
class. Thus, some number of events represent recalcitrant exper-
iences from the perspective of the current generalization. One vari-
ety of recalcitrant experience is the over-inclusive rule. The 
confrontation between the "No vehicles in the park" rule and 
Fuller's example of the vehicle used as part of a war memorial is an 
apt example of precisely this variety of over-inclusiveness,6 but 
6. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REv. 630, 663 (1958), responding to Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608·12 (1958). Actually, Fuller's example is defective insofar as the 
possibility exists that it is definitional of a vehicle that it have current locomotive capacity. 
The essential point of the example is that the instance presented be within the rule's formula-
tion but not within its purpose, and thus David Brink's example of a police car might be 
better. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 PHI. & PUB. AF-
FAIRS 105, 107 (1988). 
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other examples are all around us. The "No dogs allowed" sign in 
the restaurant seems to include within the generalization "dogs" 
seeing-eye dogs as well as the kind of dogs that ought to be ex-
cluded, and restricting the franchise to persons eighteen years and 
older precludes from voting some number of informed, perceptive, 
and intelligent seventeen-year olds. 
It should come as no surprise that constitutional law is replete 
with examples of such over-inclusiveness. Justice Stevens's opinion 
for the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBendic-
tis7 fits this mold, for in that case he made it clear that the over-
inclusive generalization that is the contract clause included within 
its literal scope some number of instances that ideally would not be 
included within that clause.s For those who read the phrase "the 
freedom of speech" as synonymous with "speech," (and I am not 
one of them9), a wide range of communicative activities not even 
remotely related to the idea of free speech seem linguistically en-
compassed by the free speech clause. Similarly, the equal protec-
tion clause might be seen as touching a far wider range of 
inequalities than those that are, under any conception, constitution-
ally problematic. And although these examples are statutory rather 
than constitutional, the same phenomenon of over-inclusiveness has 
arisen recently with respect to the tension between the language and 
purpose of both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of the Pregnancy 
Disability Act of 1978.10 With respect to the interpretation of each 
of these statutes, the simple sameness of treatment arguably literally 
mandated by the text of the law'' was in some tension with what 
was thought to be the purpose of the statutes. Any event within the 
linguistic contours of a generalization but outside of the purpose of 
the rule illustrates the potential over-inclusiveness of any general-
7. 480 u.s. 470 (1987). 
8. "Unlike other provisions in [article I, section 10], it is well-settled that the prohibi-
tion against impairing the obligation of contracts is not to be read literally." /d. at 502. 
9. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. 
REV. 265 (1981); Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity':· An Exercise in 
the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979). I am hardly unique 
in holding this view. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 18-19 (1948); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE 
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT sec. 2.01 (1984); Van Alystyne, A Graphic Review of the Free 
Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1982). 
10. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1987); United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979). 
II. The issue seems presented more clearly in CaiFed than in Weber, for a literal read-
ing of "the same" in the Pregnancy Disability Act seems Jess reconcilable with an affirmative 
action program than does the "discriminate against" language in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 
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ization, and shows one way in which recalcitrant experiences may 
arise. 
Alternatively, a recalcitrant experience may be presented when 
the extant generalization turns out to be under-inclusive. Are bears, 
for example, excluded by a sign prohibiting "cats and dogs" from 
the elevator?I2 May I ride my bicycle across a lawn on which is 
posted a "Do not walk on the grass" sign? Again, we can see em-
bodiments of the same phenomenon of under-inclusiveness in con-
stitutional law. It may tum out, for example, that there now appear 
to be good reasons for including within the scope of the eleventh 
amendment suits by citizens against their own states, but the ex-
isting generalization seems not to reach that far, precluding federal 
jurisdiction only in cases in which a citizen of one state seeks to sue 
another state.D Under the same literal ("speech" means speech) 
reading of the free speech clause I referred to in the previous para-
graph, arm bands, picket signs, flags, and oil paintings seem not to 
be included within the scope of the protection of freedom of speech. 
The most common form of under-inclusion, as in the "cats and 
dogs" example, is the incomplete list. A recalcitrant experience is 
presented whenever a certain power appears to be one that Con-
gress ought to have in light of the deeper justifications for congres-
sional power, yet is not found in article I, section 8, or any other 
parts of the Constitution giving power to Congress. The incomplete 
list also arises with respect to limitations on governmental powers. 
Insofar as the particular rights listed in the Bill of Rights, for exam-
ple, represent the instantiation of some deeper principle or princi-
ples, some other right can be seen to emanate from the deeper 
principle yet not be contained on the textually enumerated list. The 
right to privacy is the most currently prominent example of this 
phenomenon, but there are others as well. Consider the Court's de-
termination in In re Winship I4 that the right to put the prosecution 
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while not textually enumer-
ated, would nevertheless be taken to be as constitutionally man-
dated as are the specifically enumerated protections. 
12. I owe the example to my colleague Doug Kahn. 
13. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
u.s. I, 9-10 (1890). 
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). It is true, of course, that the due process clauses of the fifth 
and fourteenth amendments provide a textually respectable grounding for the authority to 
add to an enumerated list, especially a list of procedural protections available to a criminal 
defendant. The ninth amendment can be said to serve parallel purposes. But that those 
provisions can be so interpreted does not mean that they must be interpreted as effectively 
adding "E.g.," at the commencement of the Bill of Rights. Given the due process clauses and 
the ninth amendment, such a course seems textually permissible. Whether it is desirable is 
another question, one that goes to the very questions I seek to address here. 
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These and numerous other examples demonstrate the way in 
which a rule necessarily applies its normative pressure to a category, 
a category that is the instantiation of some deeper justification. 1s 
Sometimes, the category selected to instantiate the justification may 
appear to be maximally precise at the time of selection. Yet with 
the unfolding of reality subsequent events may challenge the previ-
ously assumed congruence between instantiated category and justifi-
cation.'6 The rights listed in 1791 in the Bill of Rights may have 
been at the time the only ones thought necessary to further the 
deeper purposes behind the Bill of Rights. Only with the passage of 
time and changes in the world do the assumptions made at the time 
of crafting the rule become questionable. Only when a different 
world makes government data banks more of a problem than the 
quartering of troops in private homes do we need to ask whether the 
Constitution is strongly rule-bound. 
More commonly, rules are not created with the expectation 
that every member of the instantiated category will fit the justifica-
tion. We know in advance that not every person over eighteen is 
qualified to drive, to drink, or to vote, and we know that not every-
one over seventy is unqualified to work. We know that not every-
one who owns more than ten percent of the shares of a corporation 
is privy to inside information, and we know in advance that not 
every act of price fixing is economically disadvantageous. Still, the 
identified category is statistically relevant to the deeper goal or dan-
ger, and thus the rule does not seem arbitrary. But although the 
rule is not arbitrary, some cases will still exist in which the general-
ization is inapt. What is true for most cases may not be true for this 
one. 
Thus, rules incorporate and apply their prescriptive pressure to 
a category bearing at least a probabilistic relationship to the justifi-
cation undergirding the rule. Rules get interesting, however, when 
some member of the category is within the category as stated but 
not within the background justification. What is to happen in such 
cases? Under one approach, the instantiated category operates 
merely as a rule of thumb. It has no intrinsic normative weight, so 
15. This deeper justification, or purpose, need not be based either on history or on the 
actual intentions of those who wrote the text. I distinguish the purpose of a rule from the 
psychological states of those who drafted it. 
16. It might have been thought at the time of creating the category of "vehicles" in the 
"no vehicles in the park" rule that all (and only) vehicles would fit with the purposes of the 
justification (say, elimination of noise, or danger, or fumes) that inspired the rule in the first 
instance. But then we are presented with the possibility that some vehicles, for example 
police cars or vehicles serving as statues, are still within the instantiated category while not 
serving the justifications that inspired that category. Then and only then do the central ten-
sions of ruleness appear. 
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an event being a member of the instantiated category supplies no 
decisional weight beyond that supplied by the event falling within 
the scope of the background justification. Under the rule of thumb 
approach, therefore, the rules themselves add nothing, and become 
continuously defeasible in the service of their generating 
justifications. 
By contrast, we can imagine a decisional process in which 
these instantiated categories are entrenched. That is, their existence 
qua category provides a reason for decision (although not necessar-
ily a conclusive one) even in those cases in which the item falling 
within the instantiated category does not fall within the background 
justification. This decisional process gives intrinsic weight to the 
very fact of instantiation, or crystallization. It is this mode of deci-
sionmaking that I want to refer to as rule-based decisionmaking. 
Thus, a rule as I conceive it is a characterization of a relation-
ship between an instantiation (at whatever level) and its background 
justification. Rules exist when, and insofar as, the crystallized in-
stantiation is itself capable of providing a reason for action. To put 
it differently, when the crystallization offers at least some resistance 
to applying the background justification directly to the case at hand, 
then and only then can we say that the crystallization is a rule. 
When the fact that the rule excludes vehicles provides a reason to 
exclude vehicles even when the justification behind the rule is not 
served, the rule operates in the strong sense I am now describing. 
When the fact that the Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978 prescribes 
that pregnant and non-pregnant people shall be treated "the same" 
is taken at least to constitute an impediment to a program favoring 
pregnant women, we again see the operation of a rule in this sense. 
Similarly, when the facts that the Bill of Rights refers to speech but 
not privacy, that the fourteenth amendment applies its strictures 
only to "states," and that the Constitution provides a right to coun-
sel but not to proof beyond a reasonable doubt are taken to be 
problems, rules can be said to exist in substance as well as in form. 
II 
We have now seen what rule-governed decisionmaking looks 
like, and we have seen earlier that not everything entitled to the 
appellation "law" need necessarily take place in rule-governed 
mode. We can now turn to the central question. When, if at all, 
should constitutional law operate in rule-governed mode? 
The answer to this question is likely to vary depending on 
which facet of constitutional law is before us for inspection. If we 
are asking questions about the appropriate style of constitutional 
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decisionmaking, we must know what a constitutional decision is. 
Let us look at some examples. Consider the following constitu-
tional decisions: a police officer deciding whether to obtain a war-
rant before searching a suspect; a police officer deciding whether to 
warn a suspect prior to interrogation; a clerk at the park depart-
ment or the highway department deciding whether to withhold a 
parade or picnic permit because the applicant is the Communist 
Party of the United States; a governor of a state considering 
whether to introduce legislation banning the sale of wine produced 
in other states; a school official deciding whether to assign a black 
child to a school that she thinks already has too many blacks; a 
president deciding whether to consult with Congress prior to taking 
hostile action against another nation; and so on. 11 
In all these cases, a governmental official is faced with several 
courses of action, some of which might be constitutionally created, 
others of which might be constitutionally required, and still others 
of which might be constitutionally prohibited. Let us call this the 
category of government decisions with constitutional implications. 
Now let us tum to a second category of constitutional deci-
sions-those likely to confront courts other than the Supreme 
Court. Consider, then, the following putative constitutional deci-
sions: whether a trial judge in instructing the jury in a criminal case 
should observe that the defendant's refusal to testify in her own de-
fense is probative of her guilt; whether a trial judge, prior to the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Palmore v. Sidoti,1s should have 
considered the effects of an interracial remarriage in determining 
which custodial arrangement is in the best interests of the child; 
whether a trial judge subsequent to Palmore should have considered 
that factor; whether a trial judge should dismiss an indictment for 
disturbing the peace by virtue of the defendant having claimed that 
numerous scientists had demonstrated conclusively that blacks were 
genetically less intelligent; whether a federal district court judge sit-
ting in the Fifth Circuit should in 1988 uphold against constitu-
tional attack an anti-pornography ordinance worded identically to 
that struck down in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut;'9 
17. Obviously many refinements could be added. We could distinguish elected from 
appointed officials, state from federal, Congress from the president, and so on. We could also 
distinguish cases in which the constitutional implications come directly from the text (Presi-
dent Reagan's decision whether to run for a third term) from those in which the constitu-
tional implication, while having a textual provenance, comes more immediately from a court 
decision (the police officer's decision whether to warn a suspect prior to interrogation that 
anything he says may be used against him). But for the present these refinements are 
unnecessary. 
18. 466 u.s. 429 (1984). 
19. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
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and whether a federal district court judge sitting in the Seventh Cir-
cuit should reach the same conclusion. 
Again, various refinements of this picture of lower courts are 
plausible, but the refinements need not detain us here. The impor-
tant point is that there are some number of cases that might be 
presented to a lower court in which higher court constitutional de-
cisions might seem to require an otherwise undesirable result from 
the perspective of the then-deciding court, or seem to prohibit what 
would appear to the deciding judge to be an otherwise desirable re-
sult, or, much more commonly, establish the framework in which 
the issues are to be perceived. Even though the process of judging 
may require a great deal of judgment, a lower court constitutional 
decision in a defamation case will still lie within the framework for 
analysis created by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 20 (Is it open to 
the trial judge, for example, to place great weight on the fact that 
the plaintiff, although a public official, had performed a number of 
good deeds in the past? Can the judge also take as relevant the fact 
that the same public official would not have accepted the job had 
she known the kinds of things that might be said about her?). Simi-
larly, what is relevant and what is irrelevant in a search-and-seizure 
case will have been determined by some number of Supreme Court 
cases. What can be taken into account in response to a claim that a 
piece of federal legislation intrudes on the prerogatives of the states 
will be different after Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority2l than before. With respect to constitutional decision-
making in the domains just described, it appears that the prevailing 
view (and practice) is that such decisions should take place within 
an environment that is moderately to severely rule-bound. Rarely, 
of course, do decisionmakers situated as are these have to confront 
uninterpreted constitutional text, or uninterpreted constitutional 
"raw material" of any kind. Instead, the most common source of 
constitutional mandate for these officials comes from Supreme 
Court decisions, and, for officials and trial judges, from decisions of 
appellate courts other than the Supreme Court. When a rule laid 
down by the Supreme Court or a higher court seems confronted 
with a recalcitrant experience from the perspective of the govern-
mental official or the trial judge, we seem often to expect the deci-
sionmaker to be constrained by the rule, rather than to take the rule 
as a defeasible marker for what that decisionmaker perceives to be 
that rule's underlying justifications or purposes. Thus the issue is 
the attitude that various government officers-the cop on the beat, 
20. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
21. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
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the assistant district attorney, the Attorney General of the United 
States, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Marine Corps colonel on national 
security assignment, and the judge of the municipal court in Livo-
nia, Michigan-should have to what appear to them to be constitu-
tional rules emanating usually from higher courts, but occasionally 
from the constitutional raw material itself. 
When the question is posed in this way (especially with this 
array of deliberately tendentious examples), the virtues of constitu-
tional decisionmaking in a strongly rule-bound way become some-
what more palatable. There are obviously cases in which the 
purposes behind Miranda v. Arizona22 would not be served (and 
might even be frustrated) by giving a Miranda warning, but we are 
wary of having the cop on the beat make this determination. In-
stead, something in us wants to say "Just do it" to the police officer, 
for we fear that the authority to determine whether Miranda's justi-
fications are applicable in a particular case will in practice result not 
in a furtherance but in a frustration of that purpose. 
The same perceptions seem to apply to various other govern-
mental officials. When Colonel North claims, in effect, that the pur-
poses behind the constitutional separation of powers with respect to 
war and national defense are best served, in an age of modem war-
fare and modem communications, by the actions he took, much of 
society responds quite properly that making those determinations is 
simply not his job. If the constitutional allocation of functions is 
obsolete in light of modem conditions, Colonel North is not the 
one, many of us say, to compensate for that obsolescence. 
Similarly, various Supreme Court tests might be worded in 
such a way that they appear to generate in particular cases results at 
odds with the purpose behind those tests, or with a better concep-
tion of constitutional law in general. Life is richer than any three-
part test, and thus some of those tests (rules by any other name) 
may appear sometimes to generate the wrong result, as when literal 
application of Brandenburg v. Ohio23 to the disclosure of plans for a 
nuclear weapon seems to be excessively protective to a lower court 
judge.24 Again, however, part of the understanding of many Ameri-
cans about constitutionalism includes within that understanding the 
expectation that lower court judges, when the mandates of a 
Supreme Court case are linguistically clear, will quite simply "Just 
do it." 
22. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
23. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
24. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.O. Wis. 1979). 
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Now these perspectives on the constitutional responsibilities of 
cops, constables, and colonels are far from self-evident. Rules do 
not determine their own application, or even their own force. Thus 
the issue is whether the rule-formulations appearing in the constitu-
tional text and in Supreme Court opinions will be treated as rules in 
the strong sense I have outlined above, or will instead be treated as 
rules of thumb, useful in guiding the preliminary thought of the 
officials we are discussing, but without the power to provide sub-
stantial normative pressure against the determinations of those offi-
cials as to what a deeper set of justifications and norms in fact 
requires in the individual case. This latter view is by no means im-
plausible, although it is one I find ultimately unpersuasive for most 
of the officials I have been discussing. But my point here is only to 
identify the plausibility of the rule-bound position. Even if in the 
end it is found unpersuasive with respect to the understanding of 
rules a society expects its law-enforcement and other officials to 
have, it is hardly an unreasonable position. Indeed, I would expect 
that, especially when we are thinking about the cop on the beat, the 
municipal court judge, the Attorney General of the United States, 
or Colonel North, it is a congenial position for most academic 
American constitutionalists. And if that is right, then it cannot be 
denied that a strongly rule-bound, acontextual, and non-particular-
istic perspective on constitutional norms has its place within the 
large universe of constitutional decisionmaking. 
Ill 
What, then, of the constitutional decisions of the Supreme 
Court? Should they too be rule-based in the strong sense of rule I 
have been relying on here?2s To answer this question, we might 
want to expand our understanding of the source of the constitu-
tional rules that could putatively bind a court not subservient to any 
higher court. 
One source of such rules might be the constitutional text. 
Should it make a difference, for the Supreme Court, that privacy is 
not enumerated in the Bill of Rights although other specific rights 
25. I admit that my "strong" sense of a rule is a "narrow" sense to others. Just as there 
is a positive emotive component to the word "law," so too is there often the same for "rule." 
To repeat, I disclaim pretensions to definitional imperialism. Those who would describe as 
rule-bound the common-law process, where rules can be and are remade at the instant of 
application, are not misusing the language. See Burton, Law as Practical Reason: The Rhe-
torical Hypothesis, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1989); Farber & Frickey, Practical Rea-
son and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1615 (1981). Still, there is a crucial 
difference between that decisional mode and one in which rules are not subject to revision at 
the moment of application, and it is that difference that I want to mark with the rule/ 
non-rule distinction, however stipulative my terminology may appear. 
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are? Should it make a difference that the eleventh amendment 
speaks of "another" state rather than simply of "states"? Should it 
make a difference that some powers that Congress seeks to exercise 
might only with difficulty be squeezed into the enumerated list in 
article I, section 8? Should it make a difference that neither article 
II nor any other part of the Constitution speaks of executive privi-
lege, or of inherent emergency powers of the president, or of inher-
ent foreign policy powers of the president? Should it make a 
difference that the power to declare war against foreign nations is 
textually reserved to Congress? Should it make a difference that the 
Constitution restricts the Presidency to the native-born, and mem-
bership in the Senate to those thirty years old or over? 
This is not to say that in any or all of the decisions to which I 
have alluded the text need be taken as dispositive under a rule 
bound approach. But if the text is to be taken to constitute some 
sort of strong rule (and I have yet to say that it should), then these 
textual provisions applicable to the questions I have just raised 
would at the very least create argumentative burdens that would 
not otherwise exist. 
Rule-based constraint might also come from the original inten-
tions of the framers. The various theoretical and epistemological 
problems involved in such constraint have been well rehearsed in 
the last decade,26 but again we should be careful not to let our 
newly-found sophistication provide too easy an escape from some 
hard questions.21 Should it be a problem that the framers of the 
fourteenth amendment might not have intended to guarantee inte-
grated schools, or freedom from discrimination on the basis of gen-
der, alienage, handicap, or sexual preference? Should it be a 
problem that the first amendment was not intended to interfere with 
laws against blasphemy, defamation, and perhaps even seditious li-
bel? Had the Equal Rights Amendment been ratified, should it 
have made a difference that the framers did not intend it to apply to 
lavatory facilities? 
Finally, and perhaps most important, the question of ruleness 
might be presented by previous decisions of the Supreme Court it-
self. Should the existence of Plessy v. Ferguson 2s have made a dif-
ference in Brown v. Board of Education ?29 Should the existence of 
26. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 
204 (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981); Tushnet, Fol-
lowing the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 781 (1983). 
27. See Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal ofOriginalism, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 773. 
28. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
29. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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United States v. Darby 3o have made a difference to the majority in 
National League of Cities v. Usery?31 Should the existence of Usery 
have made a difference to the majority in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Municipal Transit Authority?32 Should the existence of Garcia 
make a difference to the hypothetical future majority referred to in 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in that case? Although the question of 
determining what is a precedent for what is complex,33 previous de-
cisions of the Court could operate, under a strong system of stare 
decisis, in much the same way that rules operate. 
I do not deny that distinctions can be drawn among text, origi-
nal intent, and stare decisis, and that one could plausibly embrace, 
for example, textual and precedential constraint while rejecting the 
relevance of original intent.34 But distinguishing among the three is 
not central to my task here, for their similarities are at least as im-
portant as their differences. The three sources of constraint all 
share in common just that-they are sources of constraint, in the 
strong rule-based sense that I have been talking about. Each of the 
three is susceptible to a strong rule interpretation, to a frankly for-
malistic approach. The combination of the three therefore presents 
the central question of Supreme Court constitutional decisionmak-
ing. Should that process be substantially rule-free, using the raw 
material of constitutional text, history, and case law for education 
and guidance, but not as intrinsically weighty rules, capable of in-
terfering with what appears at the time of decision to be the best 
reading of all the relevant sources of constitutional decision? Or 
should some or all of these materials be treated as rules, in a strong 
sense, capable of formalistically interfering with the ability of sensi-
tive justices to make the best constitutional decisions? 
As a society thinks about how it answers these questions, about 
what it expects its Supreme Court to do, about whether it expects 
its Supreme Court to be rule-bound in my sense, it is important to 
begin with the premise that neither answer is necessary and neither 
answer is illegitimate. There is a choice, and there is nothing essen-
tial about law or even about constitutionalism that dictates one 
choice rather than the other. The decision whether to take a series 
of written norms as rules in a strong sense, on the one hand, or 
defeasible indicators of a deeper reality, on the other, is not dictated 
30. 312 u.s. 100 (1941). 
31. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
32. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
33. See Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987). 
34. See Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41 
(1987); Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); Schauer, An Essay on Constitu-
tional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982) .. 
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by those norms themselves. Whether the Constitution will be read 
in rule-based form is based on the norms of the environment in 
which the document is read, and these norms are determined so-
cially, and not by the document itself. 
If I were to be asked whether the Supreme Court should make 
constitutional decisions according to a strong sense of rule, I would 
be tempted to respond with "Who wants to know?" Every one of 
the rule-furthering devices I mentioned disables decisionmakers, 
and a disabled decisionmaker is disabled from doing good as well as 
from doing ill. Although traditional arguments for ruleness have 
emphasized predictability, certainty, and reliability, such arguments 
seem to miss the point of rules, and seem especially wide of the 
mark with respect to constitutional law. Instead, we must under-
stand the ways in which rules operate as instruments for the alloca-
tion of power. Their effectiveness resides in the way in which they 
disable some decisionmakers from considering certain factors, and 
thereby from making certain kinds of determinations. Thus, just as 
cases like Palmore prevent a wise and sensitive decisionmaker from 
taking into account factors that might be relevant to making the 
best decision, so too does treating the Constitution in rule-like fash-
ion also limit the potential of even the best decisionmakers. 
Whether the issue is text, or original intent, or precedent, a great 
deal of constitutional theory has operated, broadly, under the anti-
Lochner paradigm,3s under which the dangers of a comparatively 
unencumbered Supreme Court are taken to be greater than the 
countervailing benefits that might come from the same lack of en-
cumbrance. The anti-Lochner paradigm may well be correct, either 
as a statement of political theory incorporating a preference for 
majoritarian decisionmaking, or as a statement of pragmatic politics 
incorporating an assessment of which institutions will do the great-
est good and which the greatest eviJ.36 But the anti-Lochner para-
digm remains a choice, and its merits must be evaluated against its 
alternative, a decisional mode in which Lochner itself is more likely 
to be repeated, but in which more desirable manifestations of that 
same authority are less likely to be foreclosed. 
As I have indicated, however, if the question is what would I 
tell a Supreme Court Justice to do, the answer I would give might 
vary with the identity of the addressees of my instructions,37 de-
pending on whether the inquiry is from: 1) a Supreme Court Justice 
35. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
36. See]. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitu-
tion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part 
II. Antinomial Choices and the Role of the Supreme Court, 72 IowA L. REV. 1281 (1987). 
37. Consider in this connection the story of the Four Sons in the Passover Haggadah, 
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who shares my general political outlook and whom I trust to con-
sider sensitively and intelligently the widest range of possible fac-
tors; 2) a Supreme Court Justice from whom I differ both politically 
and jurisprudentially but whom I consider open-minded and 
thoughtful; 3) a Supreme Court Justice whom I consider intelligent, 
but also devious and fundamentally at odds with me on important 
political and jurisprudential questions; 4) a Supreme Court Justice 
whom I consider to have basically good political instincts, but who 
is largely unconcerned with abstract issues of constitutional theory; 
5) a Supreme Court Justice whom I consider to have basically bad 
political instincts, but who is again largely unconcerned with ab-
stract issues of constitutional theory; 6) the nine people currently 
serving as Justices of the Supreme Court; 7) the nine people serving 
as Justices of the Supreme Court in 1968; 8) the nine people I expect 
to be serving as Justices of the Supreme Court in the year 2000; 
9) the assembled collection of people I expect to be serving as Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court from 1988 through the year 2050; 10) a 
society asking what norms it should establish for the behavior of its 
Supreme Court Justices, a process that takes place continuously, 
although it was most recently obvious during the Bork confirmation 
hearings. 
To these various perspectives might be added one more, one 
that perhaps explains much, and perhaps too much, of contempo-
rary American constitutional scholarship. That perspective treats 
the central question of constitutional law as "How would I decide 
Supreme Court cases if I were a Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and if I knew that four other Justices were sure to 
agree with me?" Now this is not an irrelevant question, but it is a 
question that necessarily treats questions of institutional design as 
being peripheral or wholly immaterial to normative constitutional 
theory. When, by contrast, questions about institutional design are 
asked, a focus on any one decisionmaker, whether real or hypotheti-
cal, is too narrow. Focusing on a larger array of actual and poten-
tial constitutional decisionmakers does not itself answer the 
question of constitutional ruleness, nor do I want to answer that 
question here. I do want to suggest, however, that evaluating the 
appeal of ruleness cannot take place without confronting the ques-
tion of who is making the constitutional decision.38 If that question 
where the story of the Passover varies depending on the intelligence and sympathy of the 
questioner. 
38. Note, of course, that this also includes questions of who is to determine the general 
virtues of constitutional ruleness, or the comparative weight of those virtues in a particular 
case. If the virtues of ruleness are seen to reside substantially in predictability, reliance, and 
certainty, it may be consistent both to recognize those virtues and to have the weight of those 
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is removed from the agenda by thinking only of the best constitu-
tional decisionmaker, or by positing some ideal constitutional deci-
sionmaker, then there is little if anything to be said for 
constitutional ruleness. But if we focus on the current and future 
array of actual constitutional decisionmakers, on the power that a 
society wishes to give them and on the use of rules as devices for 
granting or withholding power, then the selective attractiveness of 
rules increases. This is not to say that rule-bound decisionmaking, 
in the Supreme Court or elsewhere, is always or frequently desira-
ble. It is to say, however, that the question cannot be abstracted 
from a somewhat more concrete context. Thus, perhaps paradoxi-
cally, evaluating ruleness entails evaluating the selective virtues of 
acontextuality, but evaluating the selective virtues of acontextuality 
is itself a contextual decision. 
virtues in a particular case be evaluated by the rule-applier. See G. POSTEMA, BENTHAM 
AND THE CoMMON LAW TRADITION (1986). But if the virtues of ruleness are seen instead 
largely in terms of allocation of power, and in terms of selectively disabling certain deci-
sionmakers from making certain kinds of decisions, then it is far from clear that those deci-
sionmakers should be determining the weight of those disabling virtues on a case-by-case 
basis. 
